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Abstract 
This report describes the design of the test articles and monitoring 
systems developed to characterize the response of a fault-tolerant 
computer communication system when stressed beyond the theoretical 
limits for guaranteed correct performance.  A high-intensity radiated 
electromagnetic field (HIRF) environment was selected as the means of 
injecting faults, as such environments are known to have the potential to 
cause arbitrary and coincident common-mode fault manifestations that 
can overwhelm redundancy management mechanisms.  The monitors 
generate stimuli for the systems-under-test (SUTs) and collect data in 
real-time on the internal state and the response at the external interfaces.  
A real-time health assessment capability was developed to support the 
automation of the test.  A detailed description of the nature and structure 
of the collected data is included.  The goal of the report is to provide 
insight into the design and operation of these systems, and to serve as a 
reference document for use in post-test analyses.   
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1.   Overview 
The development of the systems presented in this report was supported by the Integrated Vehicle 
Health Management (IVHM) project under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program.  Among the objectives of 
the IVHM project is the development of failure databases and test capabilities suitable for the design of 
advanced health management systems.  In the IVHM project there is also interest in the development of 
enabling technologies for the design of large-scale robust and reliable distributed processing architectures 
for vehicle-wide health assessment and management functions.  To contribute to these efforts, a test was 
conceived involving an existing fault-tolerant data communication system exposed to an adverse 
environment while a real-time monitoring system collects data on the observed effects [1].  The test is 
intended not only to generate data on the direct effects of the environment, but more importantly, to stress 
the redundancy management mechanisms of the fault tolerant system beyond the theoretical bounds for 
guaranteed performance to discover the actual limits of the system implementation and expose 
weaknesses in the design.  The fault-tolerant system selected for this test is a prototype of ROBUS-2 [2, 
3], a version of the communication system of the Scalable Processor Independent Design for Extended 
Reliability (SPIDER) architecture [4].  A high-intensity radiated electromagnetic field (HIRF) 
environment was selected for the test, as such environments are known to have the potential to cause 
arbitrary fault manifestations and coincident common-mode faults that can overwhelm current 
redundancy management mechanisms [5, 6].  The monitoring system is designed to collect data from the 
interfaces and the internal state of ROBUS-2 that is suitable for detecting faulty behavior and identifying 
its root cause.  It is expected that the results of this test will contribute to the development of resilient 
processing architectures through more advanced scalable diagnosis strategies and robust distributed 
protocols. 
The SPIDER architecture consists of processing elements (PEs) executing the applications and high-
level system functions, and the Reliable Optical Bus (ROBUS) communication system, which provides 
guaranteed basic services that support PE-level services.  The goals of the ROBUS design are to reduce 
the computational burden on the processing elements, to implement the basic distributed protocols in the 
way they are most effective (i.e., in hardware), and to provide a simple system abstraction to the PEs for 
what is an inherently complex distributed processing problem.  ROBUS-2, an instance of ROBUS, is a 
time-division multiple access (TDMA) broadcast communication system with medium access control by 
means of a time-indexed communication schedule.  ROBUS-2 provides guaranteed fault-tolerant services 
to the attached PEs in the presence of a bounded number of internal faults.  These services include 
message broadcast (Byzantine Agreement), dynamic communication schedule update, time reference 
(clock synchronization), and distributed diagnosis (group membership).  ROBUS-2 also features fault-
tolerant startup and restart capabilities, it tolerates internal as well as PE faults, and it incorporates a 
dynamic self-reconfiguration capability driven by the internal diagnostic system.  ROBUS-2 consists of 
custom-designed hardware-based ROBUS Protocol Processors (RPPs) implementing the ROBUS-2 
functionality, and a lower-level physical communication network interconnecting the RPPs.  Figure 1 
shows the ROBUS topology.  The bus has a redundant active-star architecture with the Bus Interface 
Units (BIUs) serving as the bus access ports, and the Redundancy Management Units (RMUs) providing 
connectivity as network hubs.  The network between BIUs and RMUs forms a complete bipartite graph in 
which each node is directly connected to every node of the opposite kind.  All the communication links 
are bi-directional. 
In order to perform a thorough assessment of this complex communication system, the approach 
selected for this test is to perform a series of subtests with different configurations of the communication 
system and targeting (i.e., radiating) components based on the aspect of the system being examined.  In 
particular, it is of interest to assess the effectiveness of the mechanisms for internal-fault masking, node 
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recovery, and system re-initialization.  There is also interest in examining the manifestations of single-
node faults, as their severity and frequency are critical pieces of data in the design of redundancy 
management strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: ROBUS Topology 
The selected ROBUS-2 configurations are 4x2 (i.e., 4 BIUs and 2 RMUs), 4x3, and 4x4, which are 
one-, two-, and three-RMU fault tolerant, respectively.  The number of BIUs is kept constant because the 
ROBUS-2 protocols are highly symmetric (i.e., BIUs and RMUs perform largely the same operations) 
and because, for the most part, the number of BIUs used in practice is determined by the application and 
application-level fault tolerance considerations.  These ROBUS-2 configurations will be tested with one 
RMU, one BIU, or all BIUs and RMUs targeted in a HIRF radiation chamber.  For all these 
configurations, there will be extensive monitoring of the internal state of all configuration nodes and the 
interfaces to the PEs.  In addition, there will be the capability to monitor the behavior of specific ROBUS-
2 nodes at their output interfaces.  To enable a more meaningful assessment of the capabilities of 
ROBUS-2, the test will include a simplex hub configuration that is functionally equivalent to ROBUS-2 
at the PE interface but is not internally fault tolerant.  Like the ROBUS-2 configurations, the internal state 
of this single node and its behavior at the PE interfaces will be monitored. 
HIRF environments are characterized by a number of parameters, including central frequency, field 
strength, modulation envelope and duration of the disturbance.  In the interest of time, and considering the 
uncertainty about the effect that the radiation may have on the targeted components, including the 
possibility of physical damage, only a limited number of field parameter combinations will be tried in this 
test.  A test at a given frequency and envelope modulation is divided into a field-strength susceptibility 
threshold phase, in which the field strength is incremented until errors in the targeted communication 
system are detected, and a field effects phase, where the field strength is incremented in small steps up to 
a maximum predetermined strength above the susceptibility threshold.  Each radiation exposure, called a 
round, has a maximum time duration during which the radiation parameters are constant to allow the 
monitoring system to collect data about the response of the system under test (SUT) to the environment.  
A detailed description of the test plan is given in [1]. 
 
2.   Test Control and Monitoring  
The implementation of the test plan is supported by a computer system network that controls the 
generation of the HIRF environment, generates a workload for the SUT, monitors the activity of the SUT 
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in real time, and collects data for post-test analysis.  Figure 2 is a diagram of this control and monitoring 
system.  The Test Controller handles the generation and monitoring of the field, and it also controls the 
power supply to the SUT targeted components inside the test chamber.  The PE Emulator interacts with 
and monitors the SUT at its interfaces.  The Bus Monitor collects state data from the SUT components.  
The Test Control System (TCS) computers synchronize their activities by communicating via RS-232 
links using the Controller Coordination Protocol (CCP) [1].  The CCP is a handshake protocol developed 
for this test that consists of a check phase, during which the TCS computers prepare for the next radiation 
round and confirm that the SUT is operating properly, and the test phase, where the radiated field is 
activated.  The CCP allows the TCS to automatically execute parts of the test plan according to a 
predetermined test sequence.  To maintain safe operation, the TCS requires manual acknowledgement by 
the operators before initiating execution of a round.  The TCS was designed to ensure that the test 
operators are always aware of the state of the test, and it automatically returns the chamber and the 
radiated SUT components to a safe state after every round.  The TCS has built-in exception handling 
capability to automatically terminate a round if unexpected behavior from the radiated field or the SUT is 
detected.  As a last resort, the test operators can also manually terminate a round.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Test Control and Monitoring System 
The interaction of the PE Emulator and the Bus Monitor with the SUT takes advantage of the highly 
deterministic behavior of ROBUS-2 (and the simplex hub).  Although ROBUS-2 is a distributed system 
with complex behavior, its design is simplified by a synchronous-composition model that enables the 
system nodes to behave according to internal time-driven operation schedules that are synchronized such 
that the input-output activities of each node seamlessly blend with the input-output activities of the others.  
This composition model is supported by a highly precise distributed time protocol that maintains node 
synchrony.  To simplify the monitoring of the SUT, the PEs are designed to send the same message 
sequence to ROBUS-2 every cycle, which under normal fault-free operation will result in ROBUS-2 also 
sending the same results to the PEs every cycle, with possible slight timing variations that are accounted 
for in the design of the PEs.  Because of this repetitive activity at the PE interfaces, the communication 
between BIUs and RMUs, as well as the internal state of the nodes, is repeated every cycle.  This results 
in an ideal situation in which the detection of errors can be accomplished by simple direct comparison 
between the observed results and static expected results.   
The PE Emulator has hardware-implemented processes that directly interact with the SUT, and 
software processes that perform higher level monitoring activities and data collection.  The hardware 
processes are divided into two independent parts: one for interacting with and monitoring the SUT at the 
PE interfaces, and another for monitoring one specific ROBUS-2 node at its BIU-RMU communication 
interface.  The PE Emulator and the SUT communicate via custom-designed fiber-optic data 
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communication links.  The PEs are designed to synchronize to the SUT and interact with it by sending 
and receiving messages according to a fixed schedule.  There is one independent PE module for each of 
the four SUT external ports.  Each PE performs error checks on all received messages and builds a record 
each communication cycle summarizing its observations during the cycle.  The PEs also forward their 
detailed observations of each SUT message to a common monitoring module, called the Hub Fault 
Analyzer (HFA), which classifies the behavior of the SUT by applying a multi-observer-based fault 
model used in theoretical fault-tolerance analysis.  The second part of the PE Emulator hardware process 
is a Node Fault Analyzer (NFA) module that is a slightly modified version of the HFA applied to the 
analysis of node-level fault manifestations.  The NFA is used only with ROBUS 4x4 configurations with 
one radiation-targeted node.  The inputs to the NFA are derived from the observations by the nodes 
opposite the targeted one (e.g., the 4 BIU observers for an RMU targeted node).  Both HFA and NFA 
modules generate a summary record of their results at the end of every SUT cycle.  The output data 
records of the PEs, HFA, and NFA modules are forwarded to separate System Health Monitors (SHMs) 
that independently assess the status of the SUT by comparing the content of each record against reference 
records corresponding to error-free operations.  Each SHM’s assessment is combined with its 
corresponding data record and a sequence number.  The new compound record is time tagged using a 
common hardware-implemented local time reference, and then stored in buffers for the software process 
to read.  The software process executes the CCP protocol, transfers the hardware-generated records to 
data collection files, assesses the overall status of the SUT based on the SHM results, and informs the 
operator of the latest assessment results by updating a monitoring display.   
The Bus Monitor also consists of hardware and software processes.  The Bus Monitor communicates 
with the SUT via the same kind of fiber-optic data links as the PE Emulator.  The hardware processes 
collect message blocks independently sent by each of the SUT nodes containing snapshots (i.e., samples) 
of their internal state.   Each message block is checked for proper format, tagged with a sequence number, 
and packaged into a data record.  Each monitoring channel has an independent SHM that assesses the 
status of the corresponding SUT node by comparing the state data records against known error-free 
reference records.  As in the PE Emulator, the SHM results are added to the data record, time tagged and 
buffered until the software process reads it.  The software process of the Bus Monitor performs the same 
functions as the software process of the PE Emulator.    
At the end of every round, the PE Emulator and the Bus Monitor send their data files to the central 
repository using a dedicated Ethernet network as illustrated in Figure 2.  Appendix A describes the 
content of these files. 
 
3.   Physical Test Articles 
The ROBUS-2 nodes and the simplex hub are implemented using the commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS)-based nodes of the reconfigurable SPIDER prototyping platform (RSPP) developed for NASA 
by Derivation Systems, Inc (DSI) under a phase III SBIR contract.  The RSPP is a Field Programmable 
Gate Array (FPGA) based development system for the design and testing of SPIDER prototypes.  The 
architecture is a scalable modular system composed of individual RSPP nodes interconnected with point-
to-point fiber optic links.  Figure 3 shows two views of an RSPP node.  An RSPP node is a PC/104-plus 
computer system with the following functional hardware components. 
• PF3100-2V3000 PC/104+ FPGA Module: PF3100 with the Xilinx Virtex-II XC2V3000 (3 million 
gate) FPGA. 
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• PFBR104 PC/104 Fiber Optic Transceiver Module: Interfaces with the PF3100 over the PF3100 
IO connector and provides four Agilent HFBR-5905 fiber optic transceivers.  Each RSPP node has 
two PFBR104 modules providing a total of 8 fiber optic IO channels. 
• PC/104+ CPU Module: The PC/104+ CPU module is a Lippert CRR2 with a 300MHz Pentium class 
processor, 64MB SDRAM, 256MB Compact Flash, 10/100 Ethernet, VGA, Keyboard, RS232 serial 
port, parallel port, USB port, and cables.  The White Dwarf Linux operating system is installed on the 
CPU module. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: RSPP Node 
Figure 4 shows the functional components of an RSPP node.  The main function of the node when 
programmed as a BIU, RMU, or hub is implemented as a hardware process running on the static random-
access memory (SRAM)-based field-programmable gate array (FPGA).  The program for the FPGA is 
stored in non-volatile flash memory, together with functional parameters for the hardware process, 
including the node identification number in the case of ROBUS-2 nodes.  The FPGA is connected via 
low-voltage differential signaling (LVDS) [7] lines to a group of eight fiber-optic transceivers, each 
composed of independent transmit (Tx) and receive (Rx) sections, used for point-to-point communication 
with other nodes.  The complex programmable logic device (CPLD) controls the loading of the FPGA 
from flash when triggered by the CPU-controlled reset signal on the ISA bus.  When setup as a BIU, 
RMU or a hub, the CPU is not programmed, and it is only used to assert the ISA reset signal upon power-
up and in response to a reset command from the CPLD.  The CPLD acts as a pass-through for reset 
requests generated by the hardware process running on the FPGA.  This awkward implementation of a 
node-wide reset function is a side effect of the limitations of the ISA bus (where only the bus master can 
assert the bus reset signal), and also of having to modify the program of the CPLD to realize a special 
feature not originally supported by the reconfigurable module (that is, an FPGA-initiated reset).  This 
node-wide reset feature supports a policy in the design of ROBUS-2 that requires a node to reset itself 
immediately upon the detection of an internal error [2].  Document [1] has additional information about 
the RSPP.  
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Figure 4: Diagram of the functional components of an RSPP Node  
The RSPP nodes are flexible enough to support a wide range of functions with various degrees of 
complexity.  One critical disadvantage of the current RSPP nodes when programmed as ROBUS-2 nodes 
is their long initialization delay caused by the need to reprogram the FPGA every time there is a reset.  
This results in large recovery delays, and its effect is especially severe on the re-initialization delay of the 
full ROBUS-2 system.  Future versions of this platform will use a redesigned reconfigurable module that 
eliminates the CPLD and replaces the SRAM-based FPGA with a flash-based FPGA that does not lose its 
programming after a power cycle and does not need to be reprogrammed to implement a complete 
functional reset.  An RSPP node with that newer version of the reconfigurable module will not need the 
CPU to implement a reset. 
 
4.   Data Links 
All point-to-point communication between ROBUS-2 nodes and between the SUTs and the PE 
Emulator and the Bus Monitor use a custom-designed serial data link illustrated in Figure 5.  The central 
components of this link are the Manchester-encoding serial transmitter and receiver.  The Manchester 
transmitter reads in a whole word from the source process and packages it into a message, which is then 
serialized, encoded in Manchester format and sent out to the fiber-optic transmitter.  At the receiving end, 
the fiber-optic receiver recovers the bit stream and sends it to the Manchester receiver, which decodes the 
bits, rebuilds the message while performing error checks, and then sends the payload to the destination 
process together with the error syndromes.  The data synchronizers on the transmission and reception 
sides ensure reliable data transfer across clock domain boundaries.  The clock frequencies of the source 
and destination processes (SClk and DClk, respectively) are independent, and the data link does not 
constrain their values.  The design of this serial data link is based on concepts described in [8], as well as 
the Mil-Std-1553 avionics data bus [9]. 
 
 
 
Flash 
 
FPGA 
 
CPU 
 
Tx 
 
Rx 
 
Tx 
 
Rx 
 
CPU Reset 
 
ISA  
Bus 
Transceiver 
 
Optical 
Fibers 
 
 
1 
 
8 
 
LVDS 
 
Reconfigurable Module 
 
CPLD 
Fiber-Optic 
Transceiver Modules 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Fiber-optic, Manchester-encoded serial communication data link 
Figure 6 shows how data bits in their basic non-return-to-zero (NRZ) format are encoded in 
Manchester format.  Every Manchester bit consists of two half-bits, with the first half matching the level 
of the NRZ bit and the second half having the opposite level.  There is a transition at the mid-point of 
every Manchester-encoded bit.  Manchester bit encoding can be viewed as a type of 2-value phase 
encoding in which the phase of the signal with respect to a reference clock indicates the corresponding 
value of the data bit.  From this perspective, a 00
 
phase corresponds to a bit value of 1, and a 1800 phase 
corresponds to a value of 0.   
Figure 7 illustrates the data-link message format.  The first part of the message is a unique 
synchronization (sync) pattern composed of a bit-wide invalid 0 (in NRZ format) followed by a 
Manchester-encoded 0 and then an invalid 1 (in NRZ format).  The purpose of the sync pattern is to 
clearly identify the beginning of a message and to provide a timing reference for decoding the rest of the 
message.  The Manchester transmitter is designed to send a half-bit high before a sync pattern to reduce 
the uncertainty about the duration of the first half of the sync pattern.  The sync pattern is followed by the 
payload section, which is the data word submitted by the source process to the Manchester transmitter.  
The most significant bit (msb) of the data is sent first.  The last part of the message is the redundancy 
check, consisting of a single even-parity bit (i.e., set to 1 if the number of 1’s in the payload is odd, and 
set to 0 if otherwise).  After a message, the Manchester transmitter sends a constant-phase clock signal 
until the beginning of the next message. 
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Figure 6: Manchester Bit Encoding 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Data Link Message Format 
The data link design used to implement the SUTs is the result of a series of design cycles where 
various parameters like clock rates, bit rates, message format, and encoding and decoding algorithms 
were tested and compared.  The chosen design has a bit rate of 33 Mbps (megabits per second) with the 
serial transmitter running at (TxClk =) 66 MHz (i.e., twice the bit rate) and the receiver operating at 
(RxClk =) 198 MHz (i.e., 6 times the bit rate).  Although a range of payload widths can be implemented, 
for the systems developed for the HIRF test, all the data links use a payload width of 17 bits.  The error 
checks performed at the receiving end include a Manchester encoding check (i.e., Do the first and second 
half-bits have opposite binary values?) applied to the payload and redundancy check bits, a message 
parity check, and a waveform shape check, which is applied to the received signal itself rather than to 
individual messages.  The design of the reception data synchronizer allows for a maximum message rate 
of one message every two ticks of the destination process clock (DClk).  The transmission data 
synchronizer is designed to ensure that this data rate is never exceeded. 
The internal designs of the Manchester transmitter and receiver, as well as the waveform monitoring 
function, are described next. 
4.1.   Manchester Serial Transmitter 
Figure 8 shows the organization of the serial transmitter, which has a data-path-and-controller design.  
The data path has two major sections: the NRZ stream generator produces the message bits in non-return-
to-zero format, and the Manchester encoder converts the NRZ bits to Manchester format using the two-
value clock phase encoding approach.  The multiplexer in the Manchester encoder is used to output the 
invalid bits of the sync pattern by passing NRZ bits directly to the output.  The controller coordinates the 
timing of all data path activities.  The transmitter processes one message at a time triggered by the 
NRZ 
 
Manchester 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Reference Clock 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Half-Bit 
 
(Full) Bit 
 
0o 
 
180o 
 
180o 
 
0o 
 
msb 
 
lsb 
 
RC 
 
Sync 
 
bn-1 
 
b0 
 
bp 
 
---- 
 
Inv0 
 
Val0 
 
Inv1 
 
Payload 
 
half-bit 
high 
 
  
 
 
 
 
9 
Strobe_In input signal.  The Ready signal is asserted only after full processing of a message is complete.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Organization of the Manchester Serial Transmitter 
This serial transmitter requires a minimum separation between messages of one full bit.  For a 17-bit 
payload message, the maximum efficiency supported by this design is 77.3% (i.e., 25.5 Mbps effective 
data rate), or 17 payload bits every 22 line bits (3 sync bits + 17 payload bits + 1 parity bit + 1 message 
spacing bit). 
4.2.   Manchester Waveform Monitor 
The waveform monitor is a supporting function of the serial receiver meant to increase the error 
detection coverage.  Like the serial receiver, the waveform monitor operates at a frequency of 198 MHz, 
which under ideal conditions results in 6 samples per full Manchester data bit, or 3 samples per half-bit.  
The monitor samples the input bit stream and compares the samples against the characteristics of a 
properly formatted Manchester encoded signal.  The operation of the monitor is based on the concept of a 
symbol, which is a sequence of samples with a constant level (or value).  As shown in Table 1, four valid 
symbols are defined.  The allowed range of a symbol’s sequence duration is specified taking into 
consideration the effects of a phase difference between the input stream and the sampling clock, and also 
possible slight variations in the frequencies of these signals.  The symbols are used in conjunction with a 
set of rules, listed in Figure 9, that specify the allowed symbol transitions for a properly encoded 
Manchester bit stream.  A violation of these transition rules results in an immediate declaration of the 
input signal as invalid.  The monitor redeclares the input signal as valid after four consecutive valid 
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symbols are received.  This four-deep rule was empirically derived and is the result of a trade-off between 
the error coverage (waiting for more consecutive valid symbols before declaring the signal valid may 
increase the coverage), the recovery delay (waiting too long to redeclare the input signal valid can result 
in the loss of good messages), and the complexity of the implementation (a higher-complexity 
implementation has smaller timing margins, which increases the likelihood of random processing errors 
due to internal timing violations).  Notice that there is no transition rule constraining the time spacing 
between observed sync patterns.  Such a rule could increase the error detection coverage, but it would 
also increase the complexity of the implementation. 
Table 1: Symbol definitions for Manchester Waveform Monitor 
Symbol 
Label 
Level Duration 
(samples) 
Comments 
S0 Low 
(0) 
8 to 10 Sync pattern low section (A sync pattern is immediately preceeded by a 
half-bit high.) 
S1 High 
(1) 
8 to 13 Sync pattern high section and possibly first half-bit high 
D0 Low 
(0) 
2 to 7 Manchester-encoded data; up to two consecutive half-bits are low 
D1 High 
(1) 
2 to 7 Manchester-encoded data; up to two consecutive half-bits are high 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Valid symbol transition rules 
 
4.3.   Manchester Serial Receiver 
Figure 10 shows the organization of the serial receiver.  The Manchester bit stream (MBS) and Signal 
Error inputs pass through a sampler meant to ensure that metastability [10] is not a concern further down 
in the processing path.  The Signal Error input is driven by an OR gate connected to the output of the 
Manchester Waveform Monitor supporting the receiver and the logically inverted signal-detect output of 
the fiber-optic receiver.  When the Sync Detector receives a valid sync pattern, the Sampling Clock 
Generator aligns the phase of its sampling clocks to the timing of the sync pattern, and the main controller 
begins the process of recovering the message.  The Signal Check, Encoding Check, and Redundancy 
Check modules inspect the bit stream as the shift register collects the payload bits.  The Strobe_Out signal 
is asserted for one clock tick when a new message is ready.  The high clock rate driving this receiver 
enables it to process message streams with a minimum message spacing of less than one half-bit.  That 
gives the receiver a higher maximum throughput than the transmitter, which generates message streams 
with a spacing of at least one full bit between messages. 
 
 
1. S0 is followed by S1. 
2. S1 is followed by D0. 
3. D0 is followed by D1. 
4. D1 is followed by D0 or S0. 
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Figure 10: Organization of the Manchester Serial Receiver 
4.4.   Link Errors 
The main sources of data link errors are related to sync pattern detection and signal sampling.   
A problem observed early on in the development of the data link was the sporadic reception of false 
messages when there was no light input to the fiber-optic receiver.  One obvious conclusion from these 
occurrences was that the signal-detect output from the fiber-optic receiver, which is supposed to be 
deasserted when there is no light input, was not being read reliably by the serial receiver.  The cause of 
that problem was found to be a signal-standard incompatibility between the fiber-optic receiver output 
and the FPGA input.  After consultation with DSI, it was determined that there was no suitable way to 
circumvent this problem and that the designs of the waveform monitor, the serial receiver, and the 
destination process where the messages are delivered would have to accommodate this undesirable 
behavior.  The waveform monitor greatly reduced the rate of false messages for no-light conditions, but it 
did not eliminate the problem completely.  This is probably due to the fiber-optic receiver’s data output 
being allowed to float, which essentially injects a random input sequence on the signal that occasionally is 
interpreted by the waveform monitor as valid symbol sequences.  As stated previously, the design of the 
waveform monitor was the result of a trade-off between error detection coverage and complexity, and it 
was not possible to reduce the missed-detection rate to an insignificant level without compromising the 
internal timing margins of the monitor.  However, extensive testing has revealed that, although false-
message reception is still possible, it appears that the combination of the waveform monitor and the error 
detection within the serial receiver is highly effective in detecting errors in these false messages.  With the 
current data link design, none of these false messages has been observed without an error syndrome being 
asserted. 
During normal operation with all components working as designed, the reliability of the link is limited 
by errors in decoding the Manchester signal at the serial receiver.  Figure 11 illustrates how the sync 
pattern is used to obtain a timing reference SRef for sampling the half-bits of the message, and also how 
the accuracy of the SRef sample with respect to the midpoint transition of the sync pattern affects the 
timing of the half-bit samples SHalf-Bit.  Ideally, the half-bits would be sampled exactly at their midpoints, 
which would result in the smallest possible decoding error rate.    
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Figure 11: Sampling of half-bits using the sampling of the sync pattern as a timing reference 
Two possible causes of decoding errors need to be considered: drift and jitter.  The serial transmitter at 
the sending node and the serial receiver at the destination node are driven by clock signals generated by 
independent clock multipliers that use inputs from physical oscillators as frequency and phase references.  
In general, the clock signals generated by physical oscillators are characterized by their drift rate with 
respect to real time, which is a bound on the error of the oscillator in measuring the passage of time.  The 
oscillators of the RSPP nodes have a drift rate bound of ±100 parts per million (ppm).  Given the size of 
the messages (18 data bits), the bound on the drift rate of the clocks, and the sample timing margins 
(nominally, one RxClk tick on either side of the sample), the drift rate of the transmitter and receiver 
clocks by itself is not a significant contributor to the decoding error rate.   
Jitter, defined as the deviation of the significant instances of a signal from their ideal location in time 
[11], can be the dominant source of decoding errors.  Jitter has two components: deterministic (or 
bounded) jitter and random (or unbounded) jitter [12].  Deterministic jitter is bounded in amplitude and is 
characterized by a peak-to-peak value.  Deterministic jitter is due to systemic causes like electromagnetic 
interference (EMI), crosstalk, and grounding problems.  Random jitter is described by a Gaussian 
probability distribution and is characterized by its standard deviation (or RMS = Root Mean Square) 
value.  The causes of random jitter include thermal noise and shot noise, among others [13].  Assuming a 
scenario in which the timing margin of a half-bit sample is always at its minimum (i.e., the early or late 
case in Figure 11) with the clocks of the serial transmitter and receiver having maximum but opposite 
drift rates (i.e., one runs at the fastest rate and the other at the slowest rate) and taking into consideration 
the jitter contributions of the oscillator clocks, clock multipliers, and fiber-optic transceivers, it was found 
that the error rate of the data link is 10-9, or one error per billion half-bits.  Given that the timing of the 
half-bit samples is likely to have a uniform distribution around the center of the half-bits, which results in 
bigger timing margins for the average case, the actual error rate of the link should be several orders of 
magnitude better than the analyzed case.  To date, the data links have been tested with hundreds of 
billions of transmitted bits without a single error ever being detected while operating in a benign (i.e., no 
HIRF) environment.   
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Having reliable data links with extremely low intrinsic error rates is critical for the systems described 
in this report, as knowledge of such reliability is the basis for assuming that the root cause of errors 
detected during testing is the HIRF environment. 
 
5.   ROBUS-2 SUT 
The design of ROBUS-2 at the conceptual and implementation levels is described in [2, 3].  For the 
HIRF tests, the behavior and implementation of ROBUS-2 were slightly modified to suit the test 
requirements.  To reduce the SUT development burden, it was desired that a single implementation of 
ROBUS-2 be able to support all the ROBUS-2 test configurations of interest, including 4x2, 4x3, and 
4x4, with one RMU, one BIU, or all BIUs and RMUs as radiation targets.  Figure 12 illustrates the 
general system configuration for the ROBUS-2 tests.  All the communication links in Figure 12 use the 
custom data links with the payload formatted as a ROBUS-2 message (RM) [2] consisting of a tag bit and 
a 16-bit RM payload.  The parameters of the ROBUS protocol processors are set for a 4x4 system, but the 
automatic real-time reconfiguration capability allows it to support the 4x2 and 4x3 configurations without 
change.  As shown, in addition to PE-BIU and BIU-RMU data links, an RPP must support connections to 
a state monitor and to the Node Fault Analyzer (NFA).  For this purpose, the RPP was augmented with a 
test port that extracts state data from the internal units (Figure 13), including: from the Mode Control 
Unit, the control command and reset signals; from the Input Unit (IU), the schedule assessment results 
and the input message timing syndromes; from the Input Diagnostics Unit (IDU), the content and timing 
pulses of input messages, and the message content syndromes; from the Route and Vote Unit (RVU), the 
disagreement-with-the-result-of-the-vote syndromes from the message content voter and the 
synchronization voters; from the Node Diagnostics Unit (NDU), the diagnostic accusations and 
convictions; and from the Status Monitoring Unit (SMU), various node and system status assessment 
signals, including diagnostic error codes reporting the cause of unexpected RPP resets.  The SMU error 
codes are described in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: System configuration for ROBUS-2 SUT tests 
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Figure 13: ROBUS protocol processor with state-sampling test port 
The behavior of ROBUS-2 and the RPP was modified to support the Node Fault Analyzer function, 
including the requirement that the same NFA implementation be able to receive observations from either 
BIUs or RMUs without needing an explicit indication of which kind is the direct observer of the target 
node.  To simplify the design of the NFA, the observing RPPs need to send to the NFA for each expected 
message separate indications of whether the received message from the target node is correct in the 
content and timing domains.  The RPPs can do this assessment by comparing the content and timing of 
the target’s message against vote results of all the inputs.  Given that the NFA will only be used with the 
ROBUS 4x4 configuration with only one targeted node, there will always be three nodes of the same kind 
as the target that are not radiated, and if their outputs can be made to agree, they will constitute a correct 
majority at the voters.  To make this possible, the BIUs (and the PEs) were modified such that during the 
PE Broadcast communication mode of operation, all the BIUs (and their PEs) transmit all the time 
independently of the source indicated by the active communication schedule.  The PEs were designed to 
always agree on the value they send, which ensures that RMU observers always have good references to 
determine the correctness of the messages received from a radiation targeted BIU.  Changes to other 
phases of the ROBUS-2 operation were not required because the original protocols ensure that under 
error-free conditions all BIUs and all RMUs always transmit at the same time and agree on their 
messages, and, in particular, that all the good nodes of the same kind as the target will always send 
agreeing correct messages.  Accordingly, the RPPs were modified to apply inline error checks that are 
input lane independent.   
As described in [2], Appendix B, subsection B.5.3, ROBUS-2 can operate in two different reception 
modes for point-to-point communication: overlapping and non-overlapping reception intervals.  A 
reception interval is a timing window used as a reference for message arrival error checks.  The size of a 
reception interval window is determined by factors like the uncertainty in the message transmission delay 
and the precision of the time synchronization between sender and receiver.  The synchronization precision 
is dependent on the precision achieved by the synchronization protocol, the drift rate of the physical 
oscillators, and the duration of the resynchronization period.  For this implementation, ROBUS-2 is set to 
operate with a cycle rate of 300 Hz (or 3.3 ms per cycle), corresponding to approximately 10,000 local-
clock ticks per cycle with the RPPs driven by 3 MHz clock signals.  Using the data links with 60-meter 
(or 197-foot) optical fibers, the size of a synchronous reception interval was found to be 15 RPP clock 
ticks.  Two versions of ROBUS-2 are available for this test: a high-speed, overlapping-reception-interval 
version with a data introduction interval (DII) of 4 clock ticks, and a low-speed, non-overlapping-
reception-interval version with a DII of 16 ticks.  The purpose of testing these two versions is to 
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determine the relative impact of the message rate and the reception interval duration on the susceptibility 
to the HIRF environment.  For the 16-tick DII version, there is one tick between reception intervals 
during the PE Communication and Schedule Update operation modes.  A 4-tick DII version was selected 
over a 2-tick version to allow enough time between ROBUS messages to send the necessary observation 
data to the NFA.  Recall that all point-to-point communication uses the same data link design with a 
maximum message rate of 33 Mbps.  With the RPP driven by a 3 MHz clock and the serial transmitter 
running at 66 MHz, the minimum DII allowed by the data link is 2, at which the link operates with 100% 
utilization (i.e., 25.5 Mbps effective data rate).  With the DII set to 4, the link operates with 50% 
utilization (i.e., 12.8 Mbps effective data rate).  A DII of 16 reduces the utilization to 12.5% (i.e., 3.2 
Mbps effective data rate). 
To perform its analysis, the NFA needs visibility into the inline error syndromes generated by the 
observing RPPs for each expected input message from the target node.  These syndromes are divided into 
three groups: communication, timing, and content.  The communication syndromes of a channel are 
generated by the data link.  The timing checks are generated by the Input Unit and include the following: 
empty buffer (asserted if the input buffer is empty when it is time to process an expected message), input 
overrun (asserted if the input buffer is not empty after the last expected message is read from the buffer), 
and buffer overload (asserted if at any time the number of currently buffered messages exceeds a 
maximum value computed based on known bounds for the input and output message rates of the buffer).  
The content syndrome is generated by the Input Diagnostics Unit and consists of a comparison of the 
received message content against a protocol-dependent reference. 
The ROBUS-2 RPP was designed with a built-in PE interface based on a simple first-in first-out 
(FIFO) buffer-interfacing model [3].  For the system depicted in Figure 12, in which the BIUs and the 
PEs are in separate nodes and communicate only through fiber-optic data links, the RPP must be coupled 
to an interfacing module that can better handle the timing aspects of communication with a remote PE.  
Figure 14 illustrates how the PE Interface Unit (PEXU) is interconnected between the RPP and the 
Manchester transmitter (MTx) and receiver (MRx).  The PEXU consists of an Output Buffer section that 
ensures that the MTx timing constraints are met while preserving the determinism of the BIU-to-PE 
messages, and an Input Buffer section that stores the messages from the PE until the RPP is ready to read 
them.  The function of the Output Buffer section is simplified by the time-triggered operation of the RPP, 
which guarantees a deterministic message stream from the RPP during normal error-free operation.  The 
Input Buffer section is required to store a flag with each received message payload indicating if the MRx 
detected any errors with the arrival of the message or if the received message had an unexpected tag.  The 
PEs send only DATA tagged messages [2].  When the RPP’s PEIU requests the next PE message, the 
PEXU Input Buffer asserts an output error flag if either the stored error flag or the empty flag from the 
buffer is asserted.  The Output Buffer section monitors the message stream from the RPP to trigger a reset 
of the Input Buffer when the RPP outputs a synchronization message (INIT or ECHO), which indicates 
that all the expected messages from the PE for the current cycle have been read and that the buffer can be 
cleared in preparation for the next cycle [2]. 
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Figure 14: PE Interface Unit (PEXU) for an RPP configured as a BIU 
 
6.   Simplex Hub SUT 
The purpose of the simplex hub is to provide a reference system for assessing the susceptibility and 
effects of the HIRF radiation on the ROBUS-2 configurations.  The main requirement for the hub is to be 
functionally equivalent to ROBUS-2 at the PE interfaces.  This enables the reuse of the PE design, albeit 
with slightly different interface timing due to the simplex, non-distributed nature of the hub.  Document 
[2] provides a full description of the behavior of ROBUS-2.  There is no need in the hub design for the 
Clique Detection, Clique Join, and Clique Initialization modes, as those modes are meaningless in the 
simplex system.  The hub is designed to be equivalent to ROBUS-2 operating in Clique Preservation 
mode.  Document [2], subsection 3.5, describes the message exchange pattern between ROBUS-2 and the 
PEs in Clique Preservation mode.  Immediately after an internal reset (from power-up or a detected 
failure), the hub broadcasts an INIT message to synchronize the PEs and establish a timing reference for 
time-triggered operation.  The diagnosis update messages about the status of BIUs and RMUs are always 
set not to indicate convictions since those nodes are not present in the hub system.  The mode message 
always indicates that the hub is in Clique Preservation mode.  For the Id message, the hub sends a 
different message to each PE corresponding to the port a PE is connected to (e.g., the PE on port 1 
receives an Id of 1).  For Schedule Update, the PEs download their desired schedule the same way as for 
ROBUS-2, then the hub processes the messages following the algorithm for process P1 of the ROBUS-2 
Schedule Update protocol and broadcasts the accepted schedule to the PEs.  After analyzing the new 
schedule, the hub sends the assessment result to the PEs.  For the PE broadcast messages, the hub 
implements process P1 of the PE Broadcast protocol.  At the end of this mode, the hub sends another 
INIT message and the cycle is repeated.  The duration of a cycle is hard coded into the hub to match the 
average cycle duration of the ROBUS-2 implementation. 
Figure 15 shows the internal organization of the simplex hub.  The implementation uses modules and 
design ideas from the RPP where possible.  The input buffers, including their error detection and 
processing logic, are taken from the PE Interface Unit (PEXU) designed for the RPP (see Figure 14).  The 
input buffer module replaces the output of the buffer with a PE_ERROR message if the corresponding 
stored error flag is asserted or if the buffer is empty when the next PE message is read.  The voter, used in 
the execution of the Schedule Update protocol, was taken directly from the word voter in the RVU of the 
RPP.  Input lanes with detected errors are ineligible voters.  The Content Transformation module replaces 
the output of the voter with a PE_ERROR message if there are no eligible voters or the result of the vote 
is NO_MAJORITY.  The Schedule Processor, which is a slightly modified version of the design used in 
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the RPP, loads the new schedule and analyzes it for validity using the same rules as ROBUS-2.  A default 
schedule is activated if the new schedule is invalid.  The Schedule Processor drives the multiplexer 
according to the current schedule for PE Broadcast.  The Output Unit has two sections: the individual Id 
Generators (IdG), which generate the Id message based on their corresponding port number, and the 
Common Output Generator, which generates all the other messages that are identically broadcast to the 
PEs.  The Watchdog monitors the outputs and signals a failure to the controller if the time since the last 
INIT exceeds the maximum cycle duration.  The Watchdog timer is reset when all the outputs 
simultaneously send an INIT message.  This simple hub failure detection mechanism is the only internal-
error detector.  Like ROBUS-2, the hub is designed to be an independent system that provides services to 
the PEs and is PE-fault tolerant.  Faulty PEs can cause the loading of an undesired PE communication 
schedule, but they cannot interfere with the proper execution of any of the protocols, including the 
Schedule Update protocol.  The hub’s Test Port samples the internal state of the hub for remote 
monitoring.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 15: Internal organization of the Simplex Hub 
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7.   Processing Element  
The Processing Element (PE) designed for the HIRF test generates data for the SUT to operate on and 
observes and assesses the output of the SUT.  The PE is required to provide a communication schedule to 
the SUT and then send messages to the SUT according to that schedule, but it is not required to perform 
any computation other than what is needed for PE-BIU interaction.  To support real-time monitoring and 
post-test analysis of SUT behavior, the PE has to collect data on its observations during each 
communication cycle and provide a real-time observation data stream to the Hub Fault Analyzer (HFA) 
(see Figure 12) for integrated SUT analysis.   
After a reset, the PE enters the initialization mode where it first waits to receive a synchronization 
message.  Once synchronized, the operation of the PE is time-triggered and cyclic, with an expected 
resynchronization once per cycle.  Normal operation begins when a Clique Preservation mode message is 
received.  The first expected message of a cycle is the mode message.  If there is a mode message error, 
the PE aborts the cycle immediately and executes a full reset.  If no errors are detected, the remainder of 
the cycle will be completed independently of any detected errors for the other expected messages.  If there 
is a synchronization message error, the PE will continue the cycle assuming perfect synchronization (i.e., 
no local time correction is applied) until all the cycle messages are processed, at which time a 
synchronization failure is declared, followed by a reset. 
In essence, the PE is an active monitor that sends stimulus to the SUT and compares the response 
against a reference.  To simplify the design of the PE (as well as the other SUT monitoring modules), the 
PE sends messages only when the SUT is in Clique Preservation mode.  The PE uses a static 
communication schedule by which each PE is allowed to broadcast the same number of messages, and the 
total number of scheduled messages is the maximum allowed by the SUT for its particular data 
introduction interval (DII) setting.  The PE message payload is generated by a pseudo-random number 
generator (specifically, a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) with parallel outputs) [14, 15] that is 
restarted at the beginning of each cycle, thus ensuring the same sequence of messages every cycle.  Given 
the deterministic behavior of ROBUS-2 and the simplex hub, this repetitive input sequence generated by 
the PE ensures that under error-free conditions the SUT outputs the same sequence every cycle.  During 
normal operation, the PE expects to receive the message pattern described in [2], subsection 3.5, with 
time-referenced message-arrival intervals.  The PE is designed to operate with either overlapping or non-
overlapping reception intervals to support both of these ROBUS-2 communication modes.  Error 
detection is based on the assumption that the PE does not experience internal faults since it will always be 
isolated from the HIRF radiation.  Because of this, all observed errors are attributed to the SUT.  
However, the PE does not adjust its reception expectations based on detected input errors.  If the received 
Schedule Update results do not match the submitted schedule or the assessment is different than expected, 
the PE still expects to receive the same message sequence during the PE Broadcast communication phase 
as when the SUT is operating properly.  As part of its error detection function performed for the HFA 
observation data stream, the PE changes its expected message content only during PE Broadcast 
communication to reflect knowledge provided by the HFA about which PEs are in normal mode.  If a PE 
is not in normal mode, then it is not sending messages to the SUT and the expected response from the 
SUT is to deliver PE_ERROR messages during the schedule slots corresponding to that inactive PE.  
Note that the PE schedule is the same as the default schedule of the SUT, which is executed when the 
result of the schedule update is invalid.  This PE behavior greatly simplifies the implementation and is 
consistent with the assumption that only the SUT can be the culprit of observed errors. 
Figure 16 presents a simplified view of the PE’s organization.  The data processing modules of the 
Reception Unit (RU) are derived from the ones in the implementation of the RPP’s IU.  The Sync Pulse  
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Figure 16: Simplified view of the Processing Element’s organization 
Generator outputs a timing signal with a predetermined delay after the arrival of a synchronization 
message (INIT or ECHO).  The Timing Error Checks module performs the same timing checks as the 
RPP, including empty buffer, buffer-overrun (total number of received messages is higher than expected) 
and buffer overload (at a particular instant, the buffer is holding more messages than is expected based on 
the bounds for the input and output rates).  Another module, not shown in Figure 16, counts the number 
of messages received during a cycle outside of the expected reception arrival intervals (i.e., the number of 
unexpected messages).  The Input Buffer stores the received messages, the communication error 
syndromes generated by the data link receiver, and the buffer-overload timing syndrome until it is time to 
process them.  The RU Controller has two modes of operation: unsynchronized (used during initialization 
to capture the first synchronization message) and synchronized (when its operation is time-driven).  The 
RU Controller is programmed with the expected message sequence (including the communication 
schedule) and the time of the reception arrival intervals.  At the end of each arrival interval, the RU 
Controller extracts the data from the Input Buffer and informs the Data Processor (DP) about the nature of 
the expected message.  The Data Processor is responsible for determining the status of the PE, 
synchronizing the PE to the SUT, performing content error checks on the expected messages, collecting 
data about the observations during each cycle, and generating the observation data stream for the HFA.  
The central component of the Data Processor is the DP Controller, whose processing, including the 
coordination of activities by other DP components, is mostly determined by the Content_Label from the 
RU Controller.  The Data Processor receives from the HFA a vector indicating which PEs are active, and 
it supplies observations to the HFA.  The DP Controller generates the Sync_Reset signal that resets the 
local time and is used as a timing reference by the RU Controller.  The DP Controller also generates the 
PE_Engaged signal to indicate when the PE is in normal operation mode (i.e., synchronized and with the 
SUT in Clique Preservation mode).  The Send Unit (SU) Controller monitors the Local Time to trigger 
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the transmission of the schedule and the data messages.  Appendix A provides a full description of the 
cycle data collected by the PE.  The section on the HFA describes the observation data stream generated 
by the PE. 
 
8.   Hub Fault Analyzer 
The Hub Fault Analyzer (HFA) classifies the observations of the SUT by the PEs according to the 
omissive-transmissive hybrid (OTH) fault model described in Table 2.  (See [16] and [17] for an 
overview of hybrid fault models.)  The observations are with respect to the expected messages for the 
pattern described in [2], subsection 3.5.  The “data” of an observation is the content and/or the timing of 
an expected message.  Each observation is classified independently.  An omissive fault manifestation at 
an observer is one that the observer detects with its fault detection mechanisms.  A transmissive fault 
manifestation at an observer is not detected.  As an alternative to the terms omissive and transmissive, we 
use the concept of validity to capture the aspect of error detection at an observer.  The data at a particular 
observer is valid (i.e., transmissive) if it passes all the input error checks, and it is invalid (i.e., omissive) 
if it fails any of the checks.  The fault model can be expressed in terms of the four conditions listed in 
Table 3, which take into account the concepts of validity (i.e., error detection applied independently by 
each observer), symmetry (i.e., consistency or agreement of observations), and correctness (i.e., no errors) 
of the data at the observers.  The PE error checks are specified to ensure that correct data are never 
declared invalid.  However, valid data may not be correct.  The coverage of the error checks applied at the 
PEs measures the percentage of incorrect received data that a PE can detect as invalid.  Figure 17 presents 
the decision logic used by the HFA to classify an observation by the PEs.   
Table 2: Description of the omissive-transmissive hybrid fault model 
Fault Mode Description 
Correct All observers receive the same correct data. 
Omissive Symmetric  All observers declare invalid their received data. 
Transmissive Symmetric  All observers accept the same incorrect data. 
Strictly Omissive Asymmetric  Some observers receive the same correct data and others declare 
invalid their received data. 
Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric  Some observers accept the same incorrect data and others declare 
invalid their received data. 
Transmissive Asymmetric  The observers have other patterns of disagreeing observations . 
 
Table 3: Conditions used in the decision logic for classifying faults 
Condition Description 
Consistently Invalid Data  All observers declare invalid their received data. 
Consistently Valid Data All observers declare valid their received data. 
Symmetric Valid Data All observers that declare valid their received data also agree on the data. 
Correct Valid Data All observer that declare valid their received data also have correct data. 
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Figure 17: Decision logic used by the HFA for the classification of observation data 
The observation data streams from the PEs cover the following expected messages: mode, Id, 
Schedule Update results, Schedule Update assessment, PE Broadcast, synchronization, BIU convictions, 
and RMU convictions.  The error syndromes available from the PEs for each of these messages include 
communication (signal error, Manchester encoding error, and redundancy check error), timing (empty 
buffer, input overrun, and buffer overload), and expected content (compared against the valid content for 
the corresponding protocol).  The HFA classifies the observations using two different validity criteria: 
one includes the communication and empty-buffer syndromes, and the other includes the communication 
and timing syndromes.  The empty-buffer timing syndrome is used in both of these validity criteria since 
it is the one most likely to be present even in the simplest PE designs, since the most basic error check 
when expecting a message is whether any message is received at all.   
For most expected messages, symmetry is determined by comparing the content of the PEs that 
receive valid data according to the applicable omission criteria.  The only exceptions to this are the Id and 
synchronization messages.  A direct content comparison is meaningless for the assessment of symmetry 
for Id messages since each PE expects to receive a different Id.  Instead, symmetry for valid Id messages 
is replaced with a check of agreement that the valid Id messages are also individually correct for their 
respective PEs.  The PEs determine correctness of the Id message by comparing the received Id against 
their hard-coded Id (see Figure 16).  For the synchronization messages, the assessment of symmetry is 
expanded to include timing symmetry.  When an engaged PE expects to receive a synchronization 
message, it generates a timing pulse upon arrival of a message.  The timing of a synchronization message 
is symmetric if the precision of the pulses (i.e., the time between the earliest and the latest) from PEs with 
valid received messages is within the bound established by system timing analysis.  The synchronization 
message is symmetric if it is symmetric in content and timing.  Note that an expected message is always 
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declared symmetric if only one PE has a valid message. 
The PEs perform a content-correctness check on every expected message and send the syndromes to 
the HFA as part of their observation data streams.  The correct content for a message is determined based 
on the expected output when the SUT is working properly, which in the case of ROBUS-2 must take into 
consideration its fault-tolerant design with automatic reconfiguration and recovery mechanisms that 
enable it to operate even with faulty or recovering BIUs, RMUs, or PEs.  Table 4 specifies the correct 
content for each expected SUT message.  The Node Id is the value of the hard-coded Id given to each PE.  
The Default Number of Messages per PE is the predetermined number of messages per PE submitted 
during a schedule update.  As stated previously, the PEs are designed to work with a static broadcast 
schedule in which all the PEs send the same number of messages.  For synchronization and conviction 
messages, the HFA applies additional conditions to refine the definition of correctness.  At the HFA, a 
valid synchronization message is correct if its content is correct and its timing is symmetric.  In addition, 
a valid conviction message is correct if its content is correct (as per Table 4) and symmetric.  
Table 4: Specification of correct content for expected messages at the PEs 
Expected Message Correct ROBUS Message Content : (Tag, Payload) 
Mode (SPECIAL, CLIQUE PRESERVATION) 
Id (DATA, Node Id) 
Schedule Update Result (DATA, Default Number of Messages per PE) 
Schedule Update Assessment (SPECIAL, VALID) 
PE Broadcast  (DATA, LFSR value) for active source PEs; or 
(SPECIAL, PE_ERROR) or (SPECIAL, SOURCE_ERROR) for inactive source 
PEs 
Synchronization 
Preservation 
(SPECIAL, INIT) 
BIU Convictions Tag = DATA,  
Payload = {Four leftmost payload bits unspecified; remaining bits asserted} 
RMU Convictions Tag = DATA,  
Payload = {Four leftmost payload bits unspecified; remaining bits asserted} 
 
The HFA is designed to operate with whichever PEs are active (i.e., engaged) with the SUT in Clique 
Preservation mode.  It is assumed that the active PEs form a single, mutually synchronized clique.  
Immediately after an active PE receives a mode message indicating that its SUT port is in Clique 
Preservation mode, the PE outputs a timing message that enables the HFA to determine which PEs are 
active and mutually synchronized.  The HFA will proceed with the classification of observations if it 
determines that there is a single PE clique.  If at any time during a cycle the HFA detects the presence of 
active PEs that are not part of the same group, it aborts the current cycle and waits for a clique to appear.  
This feature of the HFA allows it to collect data in cycles where only a subset of the PEs is active.  Note 
that the PEs are designed such that, once they have achieved synchronization with the SUT, they always 
complete a full cycle after receiving the expected Clique Preservation mode message at the beginning of 
the cycle.  The PEs abort a cycle only at the beginning or at the end of a cycle. 
Figure 18 shows a simplified view of the HFA’s organization.  The Active Port (AP) Monitor is 
enabled by the controller after a reset or at the beginning of a cycle to determine which PEs are active.  
When the active ports are ready, the fault classifiers begin reading observations from the buffer.  The 
omission (i.e., validity) criteria for the first classifier include empty-buffer and all the communication 
syndromes.  The second criteria add the remaining timing syndromes.  The unexpected content syndrome 
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is not used for the current implementation.  The controller reads the content labels and the end-of-cycle 
(EoC) flags sent by the PEs to enable the corresponding classification rules and to output the collected 
cycle data at the end of the cycle.  The data collected by a fault classifier includes the number of 
observations for each category in the fault model.  The number of unexpected messages received by each 
PE is stored directly in a separate dedicated register.  If the AP Monitor detects a PE clique failure or the 
controller determines that the active ports do not agree on the content label or the end-of-cycle flag, then 
the current cycle is terminated immediately, the collected cycle data is output, and HFA is reset to restart 
its execution.  Note that the HFA outputs the set of active ports for use by the PEs in their correct-content 
checks.  Appendix A has a detailed description of the data collected by the HFA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Simplified view of the Hub Fault Analyzer’s organization 
 
9.   Node Fault Analysis System 
Figure 19 illustrates the organization of the node-fault analysis system.  This system is used only with 
the ROBUS 4x4 configuration with a single radiated node.  The target node is either an RMU or a BIU, 
and the observers are the nodes of the opposite kind, either BIUs or RMUs, respectively.  An observing 
RPP passes its observation data for each of the target node’s expected message to the local Direct Node 
Observer (DNO), which packages the data into message frames that are sent over to a dedicated Node 
Observation Receiver (NOR).  The NORs send their received observation records to the NFA, where the 
observations are integrated and classified according to the fault model described in Table 2.  The criteria 
for omission, symmetry and correctness are described below. 
The observers and the fault analyzer are in separate physical nodes with communication between 
DNOs and NORs via the custom fiber-optic data links.  This arrangement unavoidably introduces a 
timing error component that must be taken into consideration when the NFA assesses timing symmetry 
for messages received by the observers.  To reduce the size of this error, the NORs and the NFA are 
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driven by a faster clock signal than the observers (33 MHz for NORs and NFA vs. 3 MHz for the RPPs 
and DNOs).  This faster clocking rate has the effect of increasing the timing resolution at the NFA, which 
enhances the time measurement accuracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Node-fault analysis system 
 
9.1.   Direct Node Observer 
The function of the DNO is to relay to its corresponding NOR the observation data produced by the 
RPP for each expected message from the target node.  The DNO does this only when the RPP is in Clique 
Preservation mode.  The DNO is programmed to track the commands from the RPP’s Mode Command 
Unit (MCU) and the control signals of the RPP’s data processing pipeline, from which it can determine 
the cycle boundaries and the type and timing of each expected message.  The DNO packages the RPP’s 
received message content and error syndromes into a two-message frame that also includes control 
information like cycle begin and end flags and a content label (which identifies the expected message as 
Schedule Update, PE Broadcast, INIT, ECHO, or Collective Diagnosis).  For expected synchronization 
protocol messages, the DNO adds a third message whose relevant data is its timing and is sent a fixed 
delay after the message arrival time at the RPP.   
The previous section on the ROBUS-2 SUT describes the modifications made to ROBUS-2 and the 
RPP to support the node-fault analysis function.  In addition to the error syndromes generated by the 
RPP’s inline checks (including communication, timing, and content syndromes), the RPP generates 
content and timing correctness syndromes by comparing the observations against the results of content 
and timing voting operation.  The DNO is programmed assuming that the target node is connected to 
input lane 1 of the RPP. 
Figure 20 shows a diagram of the DNO’s organization.  The MCU command and the timing of the 
RPP data processing units drive the controller.  The first frame message (MSG0) is identified by a 
SPECIAL tag, and it carries control flags, error syndromes and the message tag received from the target 
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node.  The second message (MSG1) has a DATA flag and contains the payload of the received message.  
These two messages are sent with the minimum allowed DII of 2 clock ticks.  Therefore, the DNO 
requires that the RPP process data with a DII of at least 4 clock ticks.  For INIT and ECHO 
synchronization messages, the content of the third message is the same as the content of the second one, 
as the only data of interest there is the timing of the message.  The delay for transmitting the third 
message is set such that the NFA has had enough time to process the first two messages from all the 
observers before any third message arrives.  If the RPP does not receive an expected synchronization 
message, the DNO sets the MSG0 control flags to indicate that the third message will not be sent.  
Although all the modules of the node-fault analysis system (i.e., RPP, DNO, NOR and NFA) have been 
implemented with the resources to process ECHO messages, the DNO’s controller was revised to bypass 
sending that observation frame after timing analyses revealed that it is not possible to guarantee that there 
will not be a processing timing conflict at the NFA between the INIT and ECHO observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Organization of the Direct Node Observer 
 
9.2.   Node Observation Receiver 
The purpose of the Node Observation Receiver (NOR) is to recover the RPP observations sent by the 
DNO.  Figure 21 shows the organization of the NOR.  The NOR synchronizes to the message stream 
from the DNO by monitoring the received message tags, where a SPECIAL tag signals the beginning of 
an observation frame.  If a received frame indicates that it is the first one of a cycle, the NOR sends a 
pulse to the NFA signaling that the observation port (or channel) is active.  For an INIT or ECHO frame 
with a third message, a corresponding timing pulse is generated upon arrival of the third message.  If any 
of the data link error flags is asserted for a received message, the NOR asserts an observation-error signal 
declaring that a DNO frame is erroneous, to which the NFA responds by terminating processing of the 
current cycle observations and resetting the NORs. 
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Figure 21: Organization of the Node Observation Receiver 
 
9.3.   Node Fault Analyzer 
The Node Fault Analyzer (NFA) applies the same fault model to the observations of a node as the 
HFA does to the observations of an SUT.  Figure 22 illustrates the NFA organization.  The AP Monitor is 
different than the one in the HFA in that it requires that all ports be active and synchronized.  A failure is 
declared if at any time there is any indication that the ports are not coordinated.  The NFA has three fault 
classifiers with different omission criteria: 1) communication and empty-buffer syndromes; 2) 
communication and timing syndromes; and 3) communication, timing and content error syndromes.  An 
observation is content correct if all the observers with valid data agree that the message content they 
received is correct.  Synchronization messages are timing correct if all the observers with valid data agree 
that the timing of the message they received is correct and the timing of those messages is symmetric (i.e., 
in approximate timing agreement) across those observers.  The worst-case precision for symmetric timing 
is determined by timing analysis.  A synchronization message is correct if it is content and timing correct. 
Appendix A describes the cycle data generated by the NFA. 
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Figure 22: Organization of the Node Fault Analyzer 
 
10.   ROBUS-2 State Monitoring System 
The ROBUS-2 state monitoring system consists of independent RPP state monitoring channels for 
each BIU and RMU node.  Figure 23 shows the interconnection of components for monitoring one RPP.  
Each ROBUS-2 node has an Embedded Node Monitor (ENM) that takes samples of the state through the 
RPP’s test port and relays them to the Remote Node Monitor (RNM) in the form of three-message 
frames.  All the RNMs are located at the Bus Monitor computer, where the state updates are collected for 
real-time system monitoring and post-test analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 23: RPP state monitoring system 
 
10.1.   Embedded Node Monitor 
Figure 24 shows a simplified representation of the ENM’s organization.  The collected state data 
includes error syndromes from the RPP’s Status Monitoring Unit (SMU), the command generated by the 
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Mode Control Unit (MCU) and the node accusations and convictions from the Node Diagnostics Unit 
(NDU).  This state record is packaged into a three-message frame, where a SPECIAL tag identifies the 
first message and the other messages are given DATA tags.  The messages are sent with the minimum DII 
of 2 clock ticks allowed by the fiber-optic data link.  The controller is triggered by the MCU commands 
or by a failure detected by the SMU.  The ENM generates four state data frames per cycle during normal 
operation with the RPP in Clique Preservation mode.  Because the MCU commands and SMU failure 
detection are not mutually exclusive in time, there is the possibility of both of these state snapshot triggers 
coinciding.  In that case, the first one asserted will trigger a frame transmission, and the second one will 
be ignored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Organization of the Embedded Node Monitor 
 
10.2.   Remote Node Monitor 
The RNM recovers the state data frames.  Figure 25 shows a simplified view of the organization.  The 
controller inspects the received message tag to identify the beginning of a frame.  This allows the RNM to 
resynchronize to the incoming data stream after disruptions due to communication errors or the monitored 
node temporarily going offline.  The received message payloads are stored as they arrive.  The state data 
record includes a time tag, a frame sequence number and frame diagnosis information.  The controller 
performs error checks while a data frame is being received, including monitoring for data link errors and 
measuring the time interval between intra-frame messages.  The frame diagnosis information includes the 
Halt Code indicating the condition under which the recovery of the frame was ended (e.g., normal, timing 
violation, etc), and the actual number of messages received.  Appendix A describes in detail the content of 
the RPP state record. 
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Figure 25: Simplified view of the Remote Node Monitor’s organization 
 
11.   Hub State Monitoring System 
The hub state monitoring system has the same structure as the ROBUS-2 state monitoring system, 
including an Embedded Hub Monitor (EHM) that takes samples of the internal state of the hub through its 
test port and relays that data to a Remote Hub Monitor (RHM) on the Bus Monitor computer.  The EHM 
samples the hub’s state triggered by the controller commands or a failure indication.  During normal, 
error-free operation, the EHM samples the hub state four times per cycle.  An EHM data frame consists of 
a single message.  The RHM recovers the state sample message and adds a time index and a sequence 
number to form a state record.  Appendix A describes the content of a hub’s state-sample record. 
 
12.   System Health Monitor 
The System Health Monitor (SHM) is a generic module that provides a real-time assessment of the 
status of an SUT.  The SHM has a reusable design that leverages the highly deterministic and cyclic 
operation of the SUTs and knowledge of their recovery characteristics.  The SHM is instantiated at the 
output of every module collecting data on the SUT behavior, including PEs, HFA, NFA and state 
monitors.  When the SUT is in steady state (i.e., in Clique Preservation mode) without internal errors, 
each of those monitoring modules outputs a repetitive data record sequence with known record content 
and periodicity.  The SHM can detect the activation of faults by comparing the actual records against 
known-good reference records.  Figure 26 illustrates the SHM state transition graph.  The design of the 
SHM covers the scenario in which the SHM is enabled before the SUT, in which case the SHM will wait 
for a period of time before declaring the SUT failed.  When the SHM receives a record matching one of 
the known-good reference records, it transitions to the Recovering state, where it waits until it has 
confirmation that the SUT is working normally.  Confirmation consists of receiving only records that 
match the reference records in content and timing for a given minimum time duration, referred to as the 
stable recovery delay.  When normal operation is confirmed, the SHM transitions to the Trusted state, 
where it will remain as long as new records match the references.  Every time the SHM receives an 
unexpected record, it transitions to the Recovering state and starts the failed recovery delay timer.  If the 
SHM remains continuously in the Recovering state, it eventually times out and declares the SUT failed.  
The duration of the inactive, stable recovery and failed recovery delays is based on the operation of the 
Test Control System (TCS) [1] and the recovery characteristics of the SUTs. 
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Figure 26: State transition graph of System Health Monitor 
 
Figure 27 provides a simplified view of the SHM organization.  The content and timing reference 
records and the content comparison functions are customized for the type of module that the SHM 
instance is attached to.  The System Diagnostics Unit (SDU) and Timing Check module are the reusable 
components.  The status output indicates the current state of the SHM.  The Failure flag is asserted when 
the controller transitions to the Failed state.  Note that there are no exit branches from that state, and only 
a reset can return the SHM to operation.  The outputs of the SHM are appended to each data record for 
use by the TCS and for post-test analysis.  Wherever the SHM is used, the assertion of the SHM Failure 
output flag triggers the generation of a new record with the latest SHM data and arbitrary content for the 
fields controlled by the monitored system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Organization of the System Health Monitor 
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13.   Concluding Remarks 
The SUTs and the monitoring system are implemented on a number of FPGA configuration programs 
for the RSPP nodes.  For ROBUS-2 SUTs, two different FPGA programs were created for each node kind 
(i.e., BIU and RMU) to support the high- and low-speed communication system versions.  There are also 
two FPGA programs for the two message rate versions of the simplex hub.  The PE Emulator, which 
hosts the PEs, HFA and NFA functions, requires a different FPGA for each combination of SUT 
configuration (including ROBUS 4x2, 4x3, and 4x4, and the simplex hub) and communication speed.  
Each of the ROBUS-2 configurations requires a different PE Emulator FPGA program because they have 
different sets of SHM reference records.  In total, 8 FPGA programs were created for the PE Emulator.  
The Bus Monitor requires one FPGA program for each SUT configuration, but the same FPGA can be 
used with both communication speed versions of an SUT.  The reason for this is that the RPP and the 
simplex hub core are driven at a clock rate (3 MHz) that is independent of the actual message rate, which 
is determined by the message transmission and processing DII setting.  As in the case of the PE Emulator, 
the reason for having a different FPGA program for each ROBUS-2 configuration is that each one has 
different SHM reference records.  Thus, a total of 4 Bus Monitor FPGA programs were created (for 3 
ROBUS-2 SUTs and the hub).  Overall, including the SUTs, the PE Emulator and the Bus Monitor, 16 
FPGA programs have been created for the HIRF test.   
The ROBUS-2 RPP is described using the VHDL language, and its design is parameterized in the 
behavioral and structural domains.  This flexible description enables its use in a wide range of physical 
implementation platforms, including reconfigurable FPGA-based platforms like the RSPP.  This style of 
description was preferred as it adds portability to the design and reduces the failure risk of the 
development process by providing increased assurance that unexpected “quirks” of the physical platform 
can be accommodated without the need for large design changes.   
The simplex hub and all the SUT monitoring systems for the HIRF test were designed following the 
same parameterization principle used for the RPP.  A MATLAB script, originally developed to analyze 
the system-level parameters of a ROBUS-2 system and derive corresponding parameter values for the 
RPP, has been expanded to include the analysis of all the new systems and to compute the behavioral and 
structural parameter values for all the components.  This script is instrumental in tuning the 
implementation to support the test plan described in [1] and ensuring that all the configurations of this 
complex communication and monitoring system perform flawlessly.   
The design and implementation of the monitoring system followed a spiraling process of discovery of 
requirements and continuous design refinement supported with various small-scale concept-testing 
activities intended to gain insight into the operation of the physical hardware and available RSPP node 
software.  This process minimized the development risk and allowed the creation of a design with a high 
degree of assurance of correctness.  This approach also simplified the process of final design 
implementation and verification by reducing that step to a mapping from one design description to 
another supported by a high certainty that any observed errors in the implementation had their origin in 
the implementation description itself and not in the design.  The allocation of processes between hardware 
and software at the PE Emulator and Bus Monitor was influenced by the observed execution timing 
uncertainty of the software, the high degree of available timing control at the FPGA hardware level, the 
large available hardware real-estate on the FPGAs, and the limited available bandwidth on the ISA bus 
connecting the CPU and FPGA hardware module of the RSPP nodes (see Figure 4).  The timing of 
execution of software running on the available version of Linux, which was not a real-time-operating-
system (RTOS) version, was observed to be highly irregular with frequent relatively long lapses in which 
the CPU would not be available to interact with the FPGA module, especially when updating the operator 
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monitoring display.  This problem of loose software timing margins and the limited hardware-software 
interface bandwidth was handled by allocating all the extremely timing critical processes to hardware, by 
compacting the hardware data records as tight as possible (without sacrificing the quality of the data; see 
Appendices A and B), and by providing large output record buffers in the hardware to ensure that, even in 
the worst case, none of the generated records would be lost due to uncertainty in the interval between data 
transfers to the software.   The insight gained with the spiraling development process also helped in the 
design and implementation of the CCP software processes as it was found that a simple top-level finite-
state-machine (FSM) design significantly reduced the complexity of the solution by introducing 
modularity in the description and the execution.  This solution mapped the problem into a series of small 
problems that were easier to reason about, easily accommodated local (i.e., within a particular computer) 
and global (i.e., at the TCS level) exception handling, simplified the CCP implementation verification, 
simplified the introduction of modifications to the CCP (by localizing the impact of design changes), 
simplified the integration of the distributed CCP processes (at the Test Controller, PE Emulator, and Bus 
Monitor), and simplified the local interaction between the software and hardware processes.  This 
structured and simple design provides a strong degree of confidence about the safety (for equipment and 
personnel) of this highly automated HIRF test.  The automation also enables the execution of a large 
multi-part test plan [1] with relative ease. 
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Appendix A.   Description of Collected Data Records 
The PE Emulator and the Bus Monitor collect the data records generated by their SUT monitoring 
hardware modules and store them in files for post-test analysis.  This section describes the content of 
these data records. 
A.1.   PE Emulator Data 
The PE Emulator collects data from the PEs, the HFA, and NFA. 
A.1.1.   PE Data Record 
Table A.1 describes the content of the PE data record, which is generated by the PE after initial 
synchronization and at the end of every cycle. 
Table A.1: Data record generated by a Processing Element 
Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Time Index Integer 0 to 231 - 1 Driven by a 3 MHz clock (333 ns period);  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value (in 
approximately 11.9 minutes) 
Sequence 
Number 
Integer 0 to 28 - 1 Incremented with every new record;  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value  
SHM 
Health 
Status 
Enumerated {Inactive, Recovering, 
Trusted, Failed} 
See Figure 26 for SHM state transition graph 
SHM 
Content 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the PE 
does not match any of the reference records. 
SHM Early 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the PE 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated 
earlier than expected with respect to the previous record 
matching the timing reference. 
SHM Late 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the PE 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated 
later than expected with respect to the previous record 
matching the timing reference. 
SHM 
Failure 
Boolean {False, True} Indicates that the SHM has transitioned to the Failed 
state. 
PE Id Integer 1 to 4 Identifies the source PE for the record 
Cycle Code Enumerated {Normal_Cycle, 
Sync_Cycle, 
Sync_Failure, 
Mode_Error} 
- Normal_Cycle = Received valid mode and 
synchronization messages; 
- Sync_Cycle = Successful initial synchronization; 
- Sync_Failure = Received invalid synchronization 
message; 
- Mode_Error = Received invalid or unexpected mode 
message (“unexpected” means other than Clique 
Preservation mode after PE_Engaged) 
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Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
PE Engaged Boolean {False, True} False = PE is initializing; 
True = PE is in normal operation mode (Indicates that 
since the last reset the PE has synchronized to the SUT 
and received a Clique Preservation mode message.) 
Mode ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: SPECIAL 
Valid Payload: { 
0 = Self Test, 
1 = Clique Detection,  
2 = Clique Join, 
3 = Clique Initialization, 
4 = Clique Preservation} 
Mode message received from the SUT 
 
Correct BIU 
Id 
Boolean {False, True} True = Received valid Id message (DATA, Id) with 
payload matching the hardcoded Id given to the PE 
Schedule 
Update 
Result 1 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: DATA 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 5-16: Integer in 
range 0 to 212 - 1} 
or 
Valid Tag: SPECIAL 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 5-16:  
10decimal = PE_ERROR} 
 
 
DATA tag indicates that the payload value is the number 
of scheduled messages for PE 1;  
(SPECIAL, PE_ERROR) message indicates that the SUT 
did not receive a valid number of scheduled messages for 
PE 1; 
Any other message content for bits 5-16 indicates an 
error; 
Bit 1 = leftmost payload bit. 
----------------------------- 
Extra payload content: 
bit 1 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 2 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 3 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 4 = Combined communication error syndrome 
 
The additional information carried by the Payload field 
are the reception syndromes for this message.  Bit 2 is the 
result of OR’ing the buffer-overload and input-overrun 
timing syndromes.  Bit 4 is the result of OR’ing the data 
link syndromes: signal error, Manchester coding error, 
and redundancy check error. 
Schedule 
Update 
Result 2 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: DATA 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 5-16: Integer in 
range 0 to 212 - 1} 
or 
Valid Tag: SPECIAL 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 5-16:  
10decimal = PE_ERROR} 
 
 
DATA tag indicates that the payload value is the number 
of scheduled messages for PE 2;  
(SPECIAL, PE_ERROR) message indicates that the SUT 
did not receive a valid number of scheduled messages for 
PE 2; 
Any other message content for bits 5-16 indicates an 
error; 
Bit 1 = leftmost payload bit. 
----------------------------- 
Extra payload content: 
bit 1 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 2 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 3 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 4 = Combined communication error syndrome 
 
The additional information carried by the Payload field 
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Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
are the reception syndromes for this message.  Bit 2 is the 
result of OR’ing the buffer-overload and input-overrun 
timing syndromes.  Bit 4 is the result of OR’ing the data 
link syndromes: signal error, Manchester coding error, 
and redundancy check error. 
Schedule 
Update 
Result 3 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: DATA 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 5-16: Integer in 
range 0 to 212 - 1} 
or 
Valid Tag: SPECIAL 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 5-16:  
10decimal = PE_ERROR} 
 
 
DATA tag indicates that the payload value is the number 
of scheduled messages for PE 3;  
(SPECIAL, PE_ERROR) message indicates that the SUT 
did not receive a valid number of scheduled messages for 
PE 3; 
Any other message content for bits 5-16 indicates an 
error; 
Bit 1 = leftmost payload bit. 
----------------------------- 
Extra payload content: 
bit 1 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 2 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 3 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 4 = Combined communication error syndrome 
 
The additional information carried by the Payload field 
are the reception syndromes for this message.  Bit 2 is the 
result of OR’ing the buffer-overload and input-overrun 
timing syndromes.  Bit 4 is the result of OR’ing the data 
link syndromes: signal error, Manchester coding error, 
and redundancy check error. 
Schedule 
Update 
Result 4 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: DATA 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 5-16: Integer in 
range 0 to 212 - 1} 
or 
Valid Tag: SPECIAL 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 5-16:  
10decimal = PE_ERROR} 
 
 
DATA tag indicates that the payload value is the number 
of scheduled messages for PE 4;  
(SPECIAL, PE_ERROR) message indicates that the SUT 
did not receive a valid number of scheduled messages for 
PE 4; 
Any other message content for bits 5-16 indicates an 
error; 
Bit 1 = leftmost payload bit. 
----------------------------- 
Extra payload content: 
bit 1 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 2 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 3 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 4 = Combined communication error syndrome 
 
The additional information carried by the Payload field 
are the reception syndromes for this message.  Bit 2 is the 
result of OR’ing the buffer-overload and input-overrun 
timing syndromes.  Bit 4 is the result of OR’ing the data 
link syndromes: signal error, Manchester coding error, 
and redundancy check error. 
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Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Schedule 
Update 
Assessment 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: SPECIAL 
Valid Payload: { 
5 = Valid, 
6 = Zero, 
7 = Invalid} 
Any other message content indicates an error. 
Number of 
Correct PE 
Messages 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Total number of messages during the PE Broadcast phase 
that matched the expected content for error-free operation 
BIU 
Convictions 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: DATA 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 1-4 = Conviction 
BIUs 1-4} 
 
 
Any other message content indicates an error; 
Bit 1 = leftmost bit; 
0/1 = False/True. 
----------------------------- 
Extra payload content: 
- For BIU  Convictions message: 
bit 5 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 6 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 7 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 8 = Combined communication error syndrome; 
 
- For Id message: 
bit 9 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 10 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 11 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 12 = Combined communication error syndrome; 
 
- For Mode message: 
bit 13 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 14 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 15 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 16 = Combined communication error syndrome; 
 
The additional information carried by the Payload field 
are the reception syndromes for messages BIU 
Convictions, Mode, and Id.  Bits 6, 10, and 14 are the 
result of OR’ing the buffer-overload and input-overrun 
timing syndromes.  Bits 8, 12, and 16 are the result of 
OR’ing the data link syndromes: signal error, Manchester 
coding error, and redundancy check error. 
RMU 
Convictions 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: DATA 
Valid Payload: { 
bits 1-4 = Conviction 
BIUs 1-4} 
 
 
Any other message content indicates an error; 
Bit 1 = leftmost bit; 
0/1 = False/True. 
----------------------------- 
Extra payload content: 
- For RMU  Convictions message: 
bit 5 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 6 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 7 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 8 = Combined communication error syndrome; 
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Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
 
- For INIT message: 
bit 9 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 10 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 11 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 12 = Combined communication error syndrome; 
 
- For Schedule Update Assessment message: 
bit 13 = Unexpected-content syndrome; 
bit 14 = Combined timing error syndrome, except empty-
buffer; 
bit 15 = Empty-buffer timing syndrome; 
bit 16 = Combined communication error syndrome; 
 
The additional information carried by the Payload field 
are the reception syndromes for messages RMU 
Convictions, Mode, and Id.  Bits 6, 10, and 14 are the 
result of OR’ing the buffer-overload and input-overrun 
timing syndromes.  Bits 8, 12, and 16 are the result of 
OR’ing the data link syndromes: signal error, Manchester 
coding error, and redundancy check error. 
 
A.1.2.   HFA Data Record 
The HFA generates a data record as described in Table A.2 at the end of every SUT cycle if at least 
one PE is engaged. 
Table A.2: Data record generated by Hub Fault Analyzer 
Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Time Index Integer 0 to 231 - 1 Driven by a 3 MHz clock (333 ns period);  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value (in 
approximately 11.9 minutes) 
Sequence 
Number 
Integer 0 to 28 - 1 Incremented with every new record;  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value  
SHM Health 
Status 
Enumerated {Inactive, Recovering, 
Trusted, Failed} 
See Figure 26 for SHM state transition graph 
SHM 
Content 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the HFA 
does not match any of the reference records. 
SHM Early 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the HFA 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated 
earlier than expected with respect to the previous record 
matching the timing reference. 
SHM Late 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the HFA 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated 
later than expected with respect to the previous record 
matching the timing reference. 
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Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
SHM Failure Boolean {False, True} Indicates that the SHM has transitioned to the Failed 
state. 
Cycle Code Enumerated {Normal_Cycle, 
AP_Failure, 
AP_Buf_Timeout, 
AP_Label_Asymmetry, 
AP_End_Asymmetry} 
- Normal_Cycle = Cycle completed without unexpected 
events; 
- AP_Failure = Active PEs do not form a single, 
synchronized clique (detected by monitoring beginning 
of PE cycles); 
- AP_Buf_Timeout = Active PEs failed to output an 
observation within the expected timing precision 
(detected by monitoring PE observations during a cycle); 
 - AP_Label_Asymmetry = Active PEs disagree on the 
content label of an observation;  
- AP_End_Asymmetry = Active PEs disagree on the end 
of a cycle 
Active Port 1 Boolean {False, True} True = PE 1 is active and included in the analysis of 
observations  
Active Port 2 Boolean {False, True} True = PE 2 is active and included in the analysis of 
observations 
Active Port 3 Boolean {False, True} True = PE 3 is active and included in the analysis of 
observations 
Active Port 4 Boolean {False, True} True = PE 4 is active and included in the analysis of 
observations 
Number of 
Unexpected 
Messages 1 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Number of messages received by PE 1 outside of the 
expected reception intervals during the cycle 
Number of 
Unexpected 
Messages 2 
Integer 0 to 216 – 1 Number of messages received by PE 2 outside of the 
expected reception intervals during the cycle 
Number of 
Unexpected 
Messages 3 
Integer 0 to 216 – 1 Number of messages received by PE 3 outside of the 
expected reception intervals during the cycle 
Number of 
Unexpected 
Messages 4 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Number of messages received by PE 4 outside of the 
expected reception intervals during the cycle 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
CORR value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Correct content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
OS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Omissive Symmetric content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
TS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Symmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
SOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Strictly Omissive Asymmetric 
content 
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Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
SDOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Single-Data Omissive 
Asymmetric content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
TA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Asymmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
Timing 
Classification 
Enumerated {CORR, OS, TS, SOA, 
SDOA, TA} 
Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Classification of the synchronization message (INIT); 
CORR = Correct;  
OS = Omisssive Symmetric; 
TS = Transmissive Symmetric; 
SOA = Strictly Omissive Asymmetric; 
SDOA = Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric; 
TA = Transmissive Asymmetric 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
CORR value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Correct content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
OS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Omissive Symmetric content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
TS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Symmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
SOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Strictly Omissive Asymmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
SDOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Single-Data Omissive 
Asymmetric content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
TA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Asymmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
Timing 
Classification 
Enumerated {Corr, OS, TS, SOA, 
SDOA, TA} 
Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Classification of the synchronization message (INIT); 
CORR = Correct; 
OS = Omisssive Symmetric; 
TS = Transmissive Symmetric; 
SOA = Strictly Omissive Asymmetric; 
SDOA = Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric; 
TA = Transmissive Asymmetric 
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A.1.3.   NFA Data Record 
The NFA, used only with the ROBUS 4x4 SUT, generates the data record described in Table 3.1 at the 
end of every Clique Preservation mode cycle. 
Table A.3: Data record generated by Node Fault Analyzer 
Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Time Index Integer 0 to 231 - 1 Driven by a 3 MHz clock (333 ns period);  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value (in 
approximately 11.9 minutes) 
Sequence 
Number 
Integer 0 to 28 - 1 Incremented with every new record;  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value  
SHM Health 
Status 
Enumerated {Inactive, Recovering, 
Trusted, Failed} 
See Figure 26 for SHM state transition graph 
SHM 
Content 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the NFA 
does not match the any of the reference records. 
SHM Early 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the NFA 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated 
earlier than expected with respect to the previous record 
matching the timing reference. 
SHM Late 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the NFA 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated 
later than expected with respect to the previous record 
matching the timing reference. 
SHM Failure Boolean {False, True} Indicates that the SHM has transitioned to the Failed 
state. 
Cycle Code Enumerated {Normal_Cycle, 
AP_Failure, 
AP_Buf_Timeout, 
AP_Field_Asymmetry, 
NOR_Obs_Error} 
- Normal_Cycle = Cycle completed without unexpected 
events;  
- AP_Failure = Active observers do not form a single, 
synchronized clique (detected by monitoring beginning 
of observation cycles);  
- AP_Buf_Timeout = Active observers failed to output 
an observation within the expected timing precision 
(detected by monitoring observations during a cycle);  
- AP_Field_Asymmetry = Active observers disagree on 
the value of one or more observation control fields 
(which include start-of-cycle, end-of-cycle, and content 
label ); 
- NOR_Obs_Error = Observation reception error 
detected by one or more NORs 
Active Port 1 Boolean {False, True} True = Observer 1 (BIU or RMU) is active and included 
in the analysis of observations 
Active Port 2 Boolean {False, True} True = Observer 2 (BIU or RMU) is active and included 
in the analysis of observations 
Active Port 3 Boolean {False, True} True = Observer 3 (BIU or RMU)  is active and included 
in the analysis of observations 
Active Port 4 Boolean {False, True} True = Observer 4 (BIU or RMU) is active and included 
in the analysis of observations 
  
 
 
 
 
41 
Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
CORR value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Correct content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
OS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Omissive Symmetric content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
TS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Symmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
SOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Strictly Omissive Asymmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
SDOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Single-Data Omissive 
Asymmetric content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
TA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Asymmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
INIT 
message 
Classification 
Enumerated {CORR, OS, TS, SOA, 
SDOA, TA} 
Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Classification of the INIT message; 
CORR = Correct;  
OS = Omisssive Symmetric; 
TS = Transmissive Symmetric; 
SOA = Strictly Omissive Asymmetric; 
SDOA = Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric; 
TA = Transmissive Asymmetric 
Omission 
Criteria: C, 
ECHO 
message 
Classification 
Enumerated {CORR, OS, TS, SOA, 
SDOA, TA} 
Omission Criteria: Communication and empty-buffer 
syndromes; 
Classification of the ECHO message; 
CORR = Correct;  
OS = Omisssive Symmetric; 
TS = Transmissive Symmetric; 
SOA = Strictly Omissive Asymmetric; 
SDOA = Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric; 
TA = Transmissive Asymmetric 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
CORR value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Correct content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
OS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Omissive Symmetric content 
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Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
TS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Symmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
SOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Strictly Omissive Asymmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
SDOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Single-Data Omissive 
Asymmetric content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
TA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Asymmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
INIT 
message 
Classification 
Enumerated {CORR, OS, TS, SOA, 
SDOA, TA} 
Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Classification of the INIT message; 
CORR = Correct;  
OS = Omisssive Symmetric; 
TS = Transmissive Symmetric; 
SOA = Strictly Omissive Asymmetric; 
SDOA = Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric; 
TA = Transmissive Asymmetric 
Omission 
Criteria: CT, 
ECHO 
message 
Classification 
Enumerated {CORR, OS, TS, SOA, 
SDOA, TA} 
Omission Criteria: Communication and Timing 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Classification of the ECHO message; 
CORR = Correct;  
OS = Omisssive Symmetric; 
TS = Transmissive Symmetric; 
SOA = Strictly Omissive Asymmetric; 
SDOA = Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric; 
TA = Transmissive Asymmetric 
Omission 
Criteria: 
CTC, 
CORR value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication, Timing and Content 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Correct content 
Omission 
Criteria: 
CTC, 
OS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication, Timing and Content 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Omissive Symmetric content 
Omission 
Criteria: 
CTC, 
TS value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication, Timing and Content 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Symmetric 
content 
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Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Omission 
Criteria: 
CTC, 
SOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication, Timing and Content 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Strictly Omissive Asymmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: 
CTC, 
SDOA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication, Timing and Content 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Single-Data Omissive 
Asymmetric content 
Omission 
Criteria: 
CTC, 
TA value 
count 
Integer 0 to 216 - 1 Omission Criteria: Communication, Timing and Content 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Number of messages with Transmissive Asymmetric 
content 
Omission 
Criteria: 
CTC, 
INIT 
message 
Classification 
Enumerated {CORR, OS, TS, SOA, 
SDOA, TA} 
Omission Criteria: Communication, Timing and Content 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Classification of the INIT message; 
CORR = Correct;  
OS = Omisssive Symmetric; 
TS = Transmissive Symmetric; 
SOA = Strictly Omissive Asymmetric; 
SDOA = Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric; 
TA = Transmissive Asymmetric 
Omission 
Criteria: 
CTC, 
ECHO 
message 
Classification 
Enumerated {CORR, OS, TS, SOA, 
SDOA, TA} 
Omission Criteria: Communication, Timing and Content 
Syndromes including empty-buffer; 
Classification of the ECHO message; 
CORR = Correct;  
OS = Omisssive Symmetric; 
TS = Transmissive Symmetric; 
SOA = Strictly Omissive Asymmetric; 
SDOA = Single-Data Omissive Asymmetric; 
TA = Transmissive Asymmetric 
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A.2.   Bus Monitor Data 
The Bus Monitor collects data records from the RPP state monitors or the simplex-hub monitor. 
A.2.1.   RPP State Record 
The RPP (i.e., BIU or RMU) state records are triggered by the RPP’s Mode Control Unit (MCU) 
issuing a command or by the detection of a failure by the RPP’s Status Monitoring Unit (SMU). 
Table A.4: RPP state data record 
Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Time Index Integer 0 to 231 - 1 Driven by a 3 MHz clock (333 ns period);  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value (in approximately 
11.9 minutes) 
Sequence 
Number 
Integer 0 to 28 - 1 Incremented with every new record;  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value  
SHM 
Health 
Status 
Enumerated {Inactive, 
Recovering, 
Trusted, Failed} 
See Figure 26 for SHM state transition graph 
SHM 
Content 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the RNM does 
not match any of the reference records. 
SHM Early 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the RNM 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated earlier 
than expected with respect to the previous record matching the 
timing reference. 
SHM Late 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the RNM 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated later 
than expected with respect to the previous record matching the 
timing reference. 
SHM 
Failure 
Boolean {False, True} Indicates that the SHM has transitioned to the Failed state. 
Monitor Id Integer 1 to 8 Identifies the source of the record 
Id = 1..4 => BIU 1..4; Id = 5..8 => RMU 1..4 
Message 
Count 
Integer 0 to 2 Number of messages received from the ENM for this record 
Halt Code Integer 0 to 7 1 = Message reception timeout; 
2 =Data link error; 
3 =Wrong message tag; 
4 = Valid frame; 
Others unused 
ENM 
Message 0 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: 
SPECIAL 
Payload content (Bit 1 = leftmost bit): 
Bit 1 = SMU_Failure; 
Bit 2 = SMU_No_Clique; 
Bit 3 = SMU_Accusation_Against_Self; 
Bit 4 = SMU_OK_Distrusted; 
Bit 5 = SMU_SK_Distrusted; 
Bit 6 = SMU_Timeout; 
Bit 7 = SMU_Protocol_Error; 
Bits 8-12 = SMU_Protocol_Error_Code (see Appendix B); 
Bits 13-16 = Communication status for ROBUS ports 1-4 (as  
   indicated by the corresponding Manchester Waveform   
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Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
   Monitors) 
ENM 
Message 1 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: DATA 
Payload content (Bit 1 = leftmost bit): 
Bit 1 = IU Zero_Schedule; 
Bit 2 = IU Invalid_Schedule; 
Bit 3 = MCU Node Kind  
   0 = RMU 
   1 = BIU 
Bits 4-6 = MCU Node Id; 
Bits 7-9 = MCU Major Mode  
   0 = Self Test 
   1 = Clique Detection 
   2 = Clique Join 
   3 = Clique Initialization 
   4 = Clique Preservation 
   Others unused 
Bit 10 = MCU Diagnostic Cycle (meaningful only in Clique     
   Join mode); 
Bits 11- 13 = MCU Minor Mode 
   0 = Reset 
   1 = Self Test 
   2 = Local Diagnosis and Synchronization Acquisition 
   3 = Initial Diagnosis and Synchronization 
   4 = Collective Diagnosis 
   5 = Schedule Update 
   6 = PE Broadcast/Communication 
   7 = Synchronization Preservation 
   Others unused 
Bits 14-15 = MCU Schedule Status 
   0 = Valid 
   1 = Zero 
   2 = Invalid 
   Others unused 
Bit 16 = MCU Output Enable 
ENM 
Message 2 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: DATA 
Payload content (Bit 1 = leftmost bit, OK = Opposite Kind, SK 
= Same Kind): 
Bit 1   = NDU Accusation OK node 1; 
Bit 2   = NDU Accusation OK node 2; 
Bit 3   = NDU Accusation OK node 3; 
Bit 4   = NDU Accusation OK node 4; 
Bit 5   = NDU Accusation SK node 1; 
Bit 6   = NDU Accusation SK node 2; 
Bit 7   = NDU Accusation SK node 3; 
Bit 8   = NDU Accusation SK node 4; 
Bit 9   = NDU Conviction OK node 1; 
Bit 10 = NDU Conviction OK node 2; 
Bit 11 = NDU Conviction OK node 3; 
Bit 12 = NDU Conviction OK node 4; 
Bit 13 = NDU Conviction SK node 1; 
Bit 14 = NDU Conviction SK node 2; 
Bit 15 = NDU Conviction SK node 3; 
Bit 16 = NDU Conviction SK node 4 
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A.2.2.   Hub State Record 
The generation of simplex hub state records are triggered by the transmission of a synchronization or 
mode message, by the beginning of the Schedule Update mode, the beginning of the PE Broadcast mode, 
or a detected failure. 
Table A.4: Hub state data record 
Record 
Field 
Data Type Range Description 
Time Index Integer 0 to 231 - 1 Driven by a 3 MHz clock (333 ns period);  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value (in 
approximately 11.9 minutes) 
Sequence 
Number 
Integer 0 to 28 - 1 Incremented with every new record;  
Rolls over after reaching the maximum value  
SHM 
Health 
Status 
Enumerated {Inactive, Recovering, 
Trusted, Failed} 
See Figure 26 for SHM state transition graph 
SHM 
Content 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the RHM 
does not match any of the reference records. 
SHM Early 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the RHM 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated 
earlier than expected with respect to the previous record 
matching the timing reference. 
SHM Late 
Error 
Boolean {False, True} An error indicates that the record content from the RHM 
matches the timing reference record but it was generated 
later than expected with respect to the previous record 
matching the timing reference. 
SHM 
Failure 
Boolean {False, True} Indicates that the SHM has transitioned to the Failed 
state. 
EHM 
Message 
ROBUS 
Message 
(Tag, Payload) 
Valid Tag: SPECIAL 
Payload content (Bit 1 = leftmost bit): 
Bits 1-5 = 0 each (unused); 
Bit 6 = Failure (from Watchdog); 
Bit 7 = Invalid_Schedule (from Schedule Processor); 
Bit 8 = Zero_Schedule (from Schedule Processor); 
Bits  9-12 = Next_Message (output mux control signal) 
   0 = Route (PE Broadcast) 
   1 = Vote (Schedule Update) 
   2 = Synchronization 
   3 = Mode 
   4 = Id 
   5 = Valid_Schedule (Schedule Assessment) 
   6 = Zero_Schedule (Schedule Assessment) 
   7 = Invalid_Schedule (Schedule Assessment) 
   8 = Diagnosis (BIU or RMU convictions) 
   Others unused 
Bits 13-16 = Communication status for PE ports 1-4 (as  
   indicated by the corresponding Manchester Waveform  
   Monitors) 
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Appendix B.   Protocol-Error Codes for the RPP Status Monitoring Unit  
Table B.1 describes the protocol-error codes generated by the Status Monitoring Unit (SMU).  Error 
codes not listed are unused.  See [2] for a full description of the ROBUS-2 protocols. 
Table B.1: SMU protocol-error codes 
Error  
Code 
Error Description 
1 No-Eligible-Voters after the completion of the Frame Synchronization phase of the Synchronization 
Acquisition minor mode in the Clique Detection major mode.  This implies that all nodes of the opposite 
kind are accused. 
2 No-Majority result for the Accept(ECHO) function during the Synchronization Acquisition phase of the 
Clique Detection major mode. 
3 Invalid-Eligible-Voters detected after the Accept(ECHO) function asserts its output during the 
Synchronization Acquisition phase of the Clique Detection major mode.  This error occurs when fewer than 
a majority of the eligible voters latched at the beginning of the Accept(ECHO) function remain valid after 
the function asserts its output.  This implies that there was a violation of the assumption that a majority of 
the eligible voters used by the Accept(ECHO) function were trustworthy. 
4 No-Eligible-Voters after the Initial Diagnosis in the Clique Initialization major mode.  This implies that all 
nodes of the opposite kind are accused. 
5 No-Majority result for the Accept(ECHO) function during Initial Synchronization in the Clique 
Initialization major mode. 
6 Invalid-Eligible-Voters detected after the Accept(ECHO) function asserts its output during Initial 
Synchronization in the Clique Initialization major mode.  This error occurs when fewer than a majority of 
the eligible voters latched at the beginning of the Accept(ECHO) function remain valid after the function 
asserts its output.  This implies that there was a violation of the assumption that a majority of the eligible 
voters used by the Accept(ECHO) function were trustworthy. 
7 No-Eligible-Voters during process P1 of the Collective Diagnosis protocol.  This implies that all nodes of 
the opposite kind are accused. 
8 No-Eligible-Voters during process P2 of the Collective Diagnosis protocol.  This implies that all nodes of 
the opposite kind are accused. 
9 No-Eligible-Voters, No-Majority word vote result, or all defendants convicted during process P3 of the 
Collective Diagnosis protocol. 
10 No Conviction-Against-Self during process P3 of the Collective Diagnosis protocol in Clique Detection 
mode or the first diagnostic cycle in the Clique Join mode. 
11 Conviction-Against-Self during process P3 of the Collective Diagnosis protocol in a major mode other than 
Clique Detection mode or the first diagnostic cycle in the Clique Join mode. 
12 No-Eligible-Voters, No-Majority word vote result, or all defendants convicted during process P4 of the 
Collective Diagnosis protocol. 
13 Result of process P4 of the Collective Diagnosis protocol does not match the result of process P2 in a major 
mode other than Clique Detection mode. 
14 No-Eligible-Voters during process P2 of the Schedule Update protocol.  This implies that all nodes of the 
opposite kind are accused. 
15 No-Eligible-Voters or No-Majority word vote result during process P3 (for RMUs) or P4 (for BIUs) of the 
Schedule Update protocol. 
16 No-Eligible-Voters or No-Majority Accept(INIT) result during process P1 (for RMUs) or P2 (for BIUs) of 
the Synchronization Preservation protocol. 
17 No-Eligible-Voters or No-Majority Accept(INIT) result during process P3 (for RMUs) or P4 (for BIUs) of 
the Synchronization Preservation protocol. 
18 No-Eligible-Voters during process P1 of the PE Broadcast protocol.  This implies that all nodes of the 
opposite kind are accused. 
19 No-Eligible-Voters during process P2 of the PE Broadcast protocol.  This implies that all nodes of the 
opposite kind are accused. 
  
 
 
 
 
48 
Error  
Code 
Error Description 
20 The result of process P2 of the PE Broadcast protocol does not match the message sent at the source BIU. 
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Acronyms 
AP Active Port 
BIU Bus Interface Unit 
CCP  Controller Coordination Protocol 
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf 
CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Device 
CW Continuous Wave 
DC Direct Current 
DClk Destination-Process Clock 
DII Data Introduction Interval 
DNO Direct Node Observer 
DP Data Processor 
DSI Derivation Systems, Inc. 
EHM Embedded Hub Monitor 
EM Electromagnetic 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
ENM Embedded Node Monitor 
EoC End of Cycle 
FHSTC Fine HIRF Susceptibility Threshold Characterization 
FIFO First In First Out 
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array 
FSM Finite State Machine 
HC Hardware Configuration 
HEC HIRF Effects Characterization 
HFA Hub Fault Analyzer 
HIRF High Intensity Radiated Field 
HSTC HIRF Susceptibility Threshold Characterization 
IdG Id Generator 
IDU Input Diagnostics Unit 
IU Input Unit 
IVHM Integrated Vehicle Health Management 
LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register 
LT Local Time 
LUF Lowest Usable Frequency 
LVDS Low Voltage Differential Signalling 
Mbps Mega-bits per second 
MCU Mode Control Unit 
MTx Manchester Transmitter 
NDU Node Diagnostics Unit 
NFA Node Fault Analyzer 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NOR Node Observation Receiver 
NRZ Non-Return-To-Zero 
OTH Omissive-Transmissive Hybrid 
OU Output Unit 
PE Processing Element 
PE OU PE Output Unit 
PEIU PE Input Unit 
PEXU PE Interface Unit 
ppm Parts Per Million 
RC Reverberation Chamber 
RF  Radio Frequency 
RHM Remote Hub Monitor 
RM ROBUS Message 
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RMS Root Mean Square 
RMU Redundancy Management Unit 
RNM Remote Node Monitor 
ROBUS Reliable Optical Bus 
RPP ROBUS Protocol Processor 
RSPP Reconfigurable SPIDER Prototyping Platform 
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RTOS Real-Time Operating System 
RTx Manchester Receiver 
RU Reception Unit 
RVU Route and Vote Unit 
Rx Receiver 
RxClk Receive Clock 
SBIR Small Business Innovation Research 
SClk Send-Process Clock 
SDU System Diagnostics Unit 
SHM System Health Monitor 
SMU Status Monitoring Unit 
SPIDER Scalable Processor-Independent Design for Extended Reliability 
SU Send Unit 
SUT System Under Test 
TCS Test Control System 
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access 
Tx Transmitter 
TxClk Trasmit Clock 
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